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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) No. 43300 
      ) 
vs.      ) Gem County Case No. 
) CR-2014-204 
      ) 
BRADLEY RYAN THOMASSON,  ) RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
      ) 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________ ) 
 
 
 Has Thomasson failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences of 25, 25, 10, 10 and 14 years 
determinate upon his convictions for First-Degree Arson, First-Degree Arson, Burglary, 
Burglary and Grand Theft, respectively? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Thomasson Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 In 1990 Thomasson was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder.  (PSI, 
pp. 6-7.)  Thomasson was 17 years of age at the time of the murders.  (PSI, pp. 1, 6.)  
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The district court imposed sentences of ten years to life.  (PSI, pp. 6-7.)  He was 
paroled on January 12, 2012.  (PSI, p. 7.) 
 On April 27, 2013, Thomasson burglarized two churches, stealing a computer 
from one church and a safe from the other.  (PSI, pp. 3-6.)  He set the churches on fire 
to hide the evidence of his burglaries and thefts.  (PSI, pp. 3-6.)  He absconded from 
parole at about this same time.  (PSI, p. 66.) 
 The state charged Thomasson with two counts of first-degree arson, two counts 
of burglary, one count of grand theft, and one count of petit theft.  (R., pp. 72-74.)  The 
jury found him guilty as charged after a trial.  (R., pp. 437-39.)  The district court 
imposed sentences of 25 years determinate on each arson count, 10 years determinate 
on each burglary count, 14 years determinate for grand theft, and one year determinate 
for petit theft, all consecutive to each other and consecutive to the remaining 
indeterminate portion of his life sentences from his murder convictions.  (R., pp. 453-
55.)  Thomasson appealed (R., pp. 461-63) and, on appeal, asserts his sentences are 
excessive (Appellant’s brief). 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
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abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) 
(citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). 
 
C. Thomasson Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must 
establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  To establish that the 
sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not 
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of 
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  Id.   
 The district court applied the correct legal standards, reviewed Thomasson’s 
criminal history, and concluded that he should not have the opportunity for parole.  (Tr., 
p. 977, L. 6 – p. 980, L. 12.)  Given that Thomasson burglarized two churches, stole 
from them, and then burned them to hide his crimes; that these are Thomasson’s third, 
fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh felony convictions; and that he committed these crimes 
within 16 months of being paroled from serving two life sentences for first-degree 
murder, the sentences are more than amply supported by the record. 
 Thomasson argues that his sentences are a “fixed life sentence” imposed merely 
as an impermissible “hedge against uncertainty.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  Review of 
the record and application of the relevant legal standards show that Thomasson’s 
argument is meritless. 
 “To impose a fixed life sentence requires a high degree of certainty that the 
perpetrator could never be safely released back into society or that the nature of the 
offense requires that the individual spend the rest of his life behind bars.”  State v. 
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Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 149, 191 P.3d 217, 227 (2008) (internal quotes omitted).  “[A] 
fixed life sentence may be deemed reasonable if the offense is so egregious that it 
demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or if the 
offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death is the only 
feasible means of protecting society.”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d 
1372, 1373 (1997) (internal quotes omitted).  Application of this standard shows the 
sentences to be reasonable.  
 Thomasson’s claim that the district court simply imposed a hedge against 
uncertainty instead of finding that Thomasson “so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential 
that imprisonment until death is the only feasible means of protecting society”  Jackson, 
130 Idaho at 294, 939 P.2d at 1373, is false.  The record shows that, because of two 
prior first-degree murder convictions, Thomasson spent almost 22 years in prison.  
(PSI, pp. 1, 6-7.)  Less than 16 months after being paroled, and at age 41, he 
burglarized two churches, stole from them, burned them to hide his crimes, and 
absconded from parole.  (PSI, pp. 1, 3-7.)  The district court specifically considered this 
history and the nature of the current offenses.  (Tr., p. 978, L. 17 – p. 979, L. 6.)  The 
district court reasonably concluded that although the chances of parole regardless of its 
sentence were “slim to none,” protection of the community required that no chance of 
parole be afforded by the sentences.  (Tr., p. 979, Ls. 7-15.)  Sentences that required 
Thomasson to “spend the rest of [his] life in prison,” the district court specifically found, 
were “the only way that society is protected.”  (Tr., p. 980, Ls. 9-12.)  Because the 
district court specifically found that sentences foreclosing the possibility of parole were 
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required to protect society, and the record supports that finding, Thomasson has shown 
no abuse of discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
 DATED this 17th day of March, 2016. 
 
 
         /s/   Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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